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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, I analyze the concept of a besire.  I argue that distinguishing between different types and 
interpretations of besires is a critical tool for adequately assessing besire theories of moral judgment.  I 
argue for this by applying the results of this conceptual analysis of a besire to David Brink’s version of 
the moral problem and to objections against besire theories made by Michael Smith, Simon Blackburn, 
and Nick Zangwill.   
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Introduction 
 
 Besires and cognitive internalism are often paired together.  Besires are conceptually 
understood to be unitary mental states of some belief and desire configuration and are typically defined 
in terms of beliefs and desires.1  Cognitive internalism is a combination of two theses.  The first is that 
moral judgments are beliefs (cognitivism), and the second is that moral judgments are necessarily 
motivating (internalism).  The assumption supporting the pairing of besires with cognitive internalism is 
that the acceptance of one requires the acceptance of the other, and sometimes vice versa.  This 
assumption, in its strongest variety, takes the following form:  if besires exist, then cognitive internalism 
is true; if cognitive internalism is true, then besires exist.  By separating the biconditional, we can 
formulate the weaker versions.  The second conditional (if cognitive internalism is true, then besires 
exist) seems rather implausible for there are several varieties of cognitive internalism that do not posit 
besires to defend their positions.  Here, I have in mind the two different varieties of cognitive 
internalism endorsed by Michael Smith and Christine Korsgaard.2  Smith, in fact, is explicitly critical of 
besire theories.  The truth of the first conditional (if besires exist, then cognitive internalism is true) is 
perhaps more difficult to challenge.  In this paper, I present a challenge to this conditional by 
formulating a besire theory that is committed to neither cognitivism nor internalism.  Just as cognitive 
internalism has developed allowing for differing varieties and types to emerge, our understanding of 
besire theory is in need of the same development; just as there are varieties of cognitive internalism to 
be considered, there are also varieties of besires to be considered.  The ability to make distinctions 
between different types of besires is a useful and powerful tool.  In this paper, I argue that distinguishing 
                                                             
 1 The term “besire” was coined by J. E. J.  Altham in “The Legacy of Emotivism,” in Fact, Science and 
Morality:  Essays on A. J. Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic, eds.  Graham Macdonald and Crispin Wright (Oxford:  
Blackwell, 1986), 284. 
 
2
 Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford:  Blackwell, 1994); Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of 
Normativity (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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between different types and interpretations of besires is a critical tool for adequately assessing besire 
theories.  I support this claim by showing how different conceptions of besire can 1) render incomplete 
David Brink’s way of mapping metaethical positions, and 2) help defend besire theories from objections 
made by Smith, Simon Blackburn and Nick Zangwill.  My aim is not to argue that besires exist or to 
provide a general defense of besire theories of moral judgment.  Rather, my aim is to argue that the 
analysis of besire theory, in order to be effective, must be nuanced enough to accommodate the 
different types of besires. 
 In the first section, I present the moral problem and the resulting position map as formulated by 
Brink.  In the second section, I sketch the possible conceptions of besire.  In the third section, I show 
what the conceptions of besire sketched in the second section do to the moral problem map outlined in 
the first section.  This section highlights the incompleteness of Brink’s position map and helps to develop 
the conceptions of a besire.  In the fourth section, I present my suggestions for amending Brink’s 
position map.  In the fifth section, I examine objections to besire theory made by Smith, Blackburn and 
Zangwill, and I show how different formulations of besires can be used to foil these objections.  In 
conclusion, I offer some thoughts on the direction of future besire inquiry and formulate my challenge 
to the conditional claim that if besires exist, then cognitive internalism is true. 
 
A Formulation of the Moral Problem 
 The moral problem is framed in terms of incompatible theses.  Argument over the acceptability 
of these theses has served as a popular framework for metaethical inquiry in general.  Typically, 
metaethical positions are mapped according to whether the position denies a particular claim of the 
moral problem.  I argue here that the formulation of the moral problem as given by Brink is incomplete 
because, in its current formulation, it fails to provide for an adequate assessment of besire theories of 
moral judgment.   
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 The driving force behind Brink’s formulation of the moral problem is that one cannot coherently 
hold all four of the below theses as they are.  Typically, the response is to deny or at least substantially 
modify one of the theses so as to present a coherent theory of moral judgment.  In his own words, 
Brink’s version of the moral problem includes the following four theses: 
1. Moral judgments express beliefs.  
 
2. Moral judgments entail motivation.  
 
3. Motivation involves a desire or pro-attitude.  
 
4. There is no necessary connection between any belief and any desire or pro-attitude.3 
 
For Brink, the acceptance of the first thesis defines cognitivism, and the denial of the first thesis defines 
non-cognitivism.  The acceptance of the second thesis defines motivational internalism, and the denial 
of the second thesis defines motivational externalism.  The denial of the third thesis defines rationalism 
with a commitment to the claim that beliefs motivate by themselves.  The denial of the fourth thesis 
defines rationalism with a commitment to the claim that there is a necessary connection between 
desires and beliefs and that this accounts for the motivation of moral judgments.    
Types of Besires 
 
 In this section, I construct a framework from which to analyze Brink’s version of the moral 
problem.  I do this by outlining four types of besires.  These types each allow distinctions to be made 
between different varieties of besire theory.  First, I provide a general conception of a besire.  Second, I 
examine and illustrate four types of besires. 
 
 
 
                                                             
 3 David Brink, “Moral Motivation,” Ethics 108 (1997):  6. 
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The Fundamental Criteria of a Besire 
  
 Before examining the definition of a besire, it may be helpful to reflect on the need for the 
concept of a besire.4  Why do we need the concept of a besire?  Ultimately, we may not need one.  In 
some sense, the need for the concept of a besire arises from and depends on the deficiencies of 
standard belief-based and desire-based accounts of moral judgment.  However, independent of this, the 
concept of a besire would provide a way to resolve the above moral problem.  And as such, for example, 
Smith and Blackburn use the concept of a besire to bolster their own theories of moral judgment by 
arguing that besires do not exist.5  The need for the concept of a besire may also arise from empirical 
evidence that suggests there are such besire-like states in our mental economy, and this is something I 
will comment on in the conclusion of this paper.  As I am concerned with addressing Smith’s, Blackburn’s 
and Zangwill’s arguments against besire theory and the need for a more developed framework from 
which to understand the concept of a besire, I do not consider the deficiencies of belief-based or desire-
based accounts of moral judgment.  Although showing the deficiencies of belief-based and desire-based 
accounts of moral judgment would be a necessary part of persuasively arguing for besire theory, my aim 
here is more modest.  I take the presence of the concept of a besire in the literature as sufficient to 
sustain this inquiry. 
 So, what is a besire?  Besires are posited in order to explain moral judgment.  A moral judgment 
is a kind of mental state.  The question is:  what kind of mental state?  The typical mental state 
candidates are beliefs and desires.  A belief is a mental state that represents the world as being a certain 
way.  Beliefs are mental states that represent states of affairs in the world and are propositional 
attitudes:  that is, beliefs are capable of being true or false.  In this sense, beliefs are capable of 
providing some measure of objectivity.  In other words, beliefs can be mind-independent in that the 
                                                             
 
4
 Margret Olivia Little, “Virtue as Knowledge:  Objections from the Philosophy of Mind.”  Nous 31 (1997):  
59-79.  Here, Little presents a fairly comprehensive summary of the use of the concept of a besire. 
 
5
 Smith, The Moral Problem, 118; Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions:  A Theory of Practical Reasoning 
(Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1998), 101-104.   
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content of a belief is either true or false if it is about the non-mental world; that is, for example, the 
poverty of a developing country or the passing statistics of your favorite team’s quarterback.  Beliefs can 
be mind-independent in a way that desires cannot.  So, if our moral judgments are beliefs, then our 
moral judgments are capable of being objective to some degree.  A desire is a mental state that 
motivates.  Desires are states that motivate and are pro-attitudes that are capable of leading us to 
action.  In this sense, desires are said to be capable of providing motivational force.  So, if our moral 
judgments are desires, then our moral judgments can be motivating to some degree. 
 Also, beliefs and desires are unitary mental states.  A unitary mental state is a mental state unit 
that is, in some sense, indivisible and/or whole.  A besire is supposed to be a unitary mental state.  As 
such, Zangwill characterizes besire-like unitary mental states as the following:  “*b+esires are not 
supposed to be gerrymandered mereological sums of two states    a belief plus a desire    each of which 
could occur without the other.”6  In this sense, a besire-like unitary mental state is not merely a random 
collection of mental states.  With these criteria, there could be some controversy about what counts as 
a unitary state.  One could argue that a unitary state can still have distinguishable components if the 
connection between the components is substantial enough to satisfy the above unitary state criteria.  
For example, a besire-like unitary state that is conceived as a conjunction of belief and desire under 
conditions of complete information, full rationality, or virtuous character.  The analysis and conceptual 
framework in this paper is compatible with these possible interpretations.  Also, Brink’s moral problem 
and Smith’s, Blackburn’s, and Zangwill’s arguments against the existence of besires all assume that a 
besire and the mental state expressed by a moral judgment are both single unitary states.  While there 
may be some reservations about this,7 here, for the sake of the analysis, I simply assume it as does Brink 
in his moral problem position map and as does Smith, Blackburn, and Zangwill in their arguments against 
                                                             
 
6
 Nick Zangwill, “Besires and the Motivation Debate,” Theoria 74 (2008):  51. 
 7 Richard Joyce, The Evolution of Morality (Massachusetts:  The MIT Press, 2006), 57. 
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the existence of besires.  It is worth noting that if this assumption is a problem for the besire theorist, 
then it is also a problem for Brink, Smith, Blackburn, and Zangwill. 
 If we assume that our moral judgments are expressions of only a single unitary mental state, 
then according to our standard mental state economy, we are forced to choose between a belief and a 
desire.  Choosing one over the other creates both benefits and burdens.  What specifically is at stake 
here?  If moral judgments are beliefs, then we have a straight forward way to explain why and how our 
moral judgments are objective.  Moral judgments are just like the beliefs that the Earth is round or that 
the Earth circles the Sun.  If moral judgments are desires, then we have a straight forward way to explain 
why and how our moral judgments motivate.  Moral judgments are just like the desires to go have a cold 
beer on a hot summer day or have a warm cup of coffee on a cool fall day.  However, choosing between 
a belief and a desire costs something.  The burden facing belief-based accounts of moral judgment is 
their apparent inability to account for the motivation of our moral judgments.  Beliefs are not a type of 
mental state thought to be motivating.  The burden facing desire-based accounts of moral judgment is 
their apparent inability to account for the objectivity of our moral judgments.  Desires are not a type of 
mental state thought to be objective.  A besire is posited and designed to take advantage of this 
situation.  It is designed to capitalize on the ease and straightforwardness of a belief’s capability to 
explain objectivity and a desire’s capability to explain motivation, and it might be able to do so while 
avoiding the explanatory burdens.  
 There are two definitional approaches to the conceptual design of a besire that take advantage 
of this situation.  The first approach attempts to define a besire by reference to types of mental states:  
a belief and a desire.  Belief and desire mental state components have been fairly prevalent in the 
definitions and formulations of a besire.  A possible reason for this is due to the presence of belief and 
desire mental states in the above background problem that besires are formulated to solve.  The second 
approach attempts to define a besire by reference to characteristics of belief and desire.  The second 
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approach is less specific than the first approach.  There is a difference between arguing that a mental 
state is a desire and arguing that a mental state has the characteristics of a desire.  Arguing that a 
mental state has the characteristics of a desire is a potentially broader criterion than arguing that a 
mental state is a desire.  A broader criterion allows for more options, and it creates the conceptual 
space to propose relevant characteristics of the type of mental state in question.  Determining what the 
relevant characteristics are is an important question for besire theories.  Here, I offer a potential 
interpretation of these characteristics.  I think we can stay within the conceptual confines of a besire 
and expand the range of potential types of besire-like mental states by adopting the second approach.  
So, determining the relevant characteristic of a belief, a desire, and in turn a besire is a matter of 
determining what explanatory role each needs to play. 
 More specifically, the first approach defines a besire as a belief and a desire, and analysis of this 
concept of a besire is framed in terms of the definition of a belief and a desire.  So, according to the first 
approach, a besire:   
1. represents a state of affairs in the world and  
2. is motivating.   
The second approach defines a besire as being composed of characteristics of belief and desire.  These 
characteristics can be established by the explanatory criteria such characteristics are suppose to satisfy.  
So, according to the second approach, a besire is a type of mental state that: 
1. accounts for the objectivity of our moral judgments and  
2. accounts for the motivation of our moral judgments.   
In terms of belief, if we compare the first approach with the second approach, there does not seem to 
be too much gained.  Represents-a-state-of-affairs-in-the-world already has a certain amount of 
flexibility built into the concept; it is broad enough to account for different objectivity pictures of our 
moral judgments.  For example, it is still an open question whether represents-a-state-of-affairs-in-the-
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world and is-to-account-for-the-objectivity-of-our-moral-judgments are to be determined by subjective 
criteria, cultural criteria, or universal and absolute criteria.  In contrast, in terms of desire, if we compare 
the first approach with the second approach, there does seem to be something gained.  Is-motivating 
lacks explanatory flexibility; it is not broad enough to account for different motivation pictures of our 
moral judgments.  Specifically, what this gain amounts to is the capacity to account for a wider spectrum 
of motivational theories;  that is, not only those that require that moral judgments necessarily motivate, 
but also those that can accommodate that moral judgments contingently motivate.  A more detailed 
defense of this will have to wait until later.  The important point now is that framing the conception of a 
besire from the second approach with explanatory criteria allows us to gain flexibility. 
 Both approaches have strengths and weaknesses.  Both limit what a besire can possibly be.  The 
first approach allows us to get a better grasp of what a besire is.  It defines a besire by specific and 
familiar mental states:  that of a belief and a desire.  However, it is restrictive.  I think that it is too 
restrictive, because it does not allow us to ask what a besire could be.  The second approach allows us to 
create conceptions of a besire that are beyond or something other than that of a combination of belief 
and desire.  However, it is not as concrete as the first approach about what a besire is.   
 My task here is to formulate a fundamental conception of a besire, and the second approach 
will allow that to happen in its broadest sense.  It is important to establish what a besire is, but it is also 
important to establish a comprehensive framework from which to construct the concept of a besire.  
According to the second approach and in its broadest sense, a besire is a unitary mental state that is 
capable of accounting for the objectivity of our moral judgments and is capable of accounting for the 
motivation of our moral judgments.  Satisfying the explanatory criteria with specific mental states helps 
to contribute some precision to the possible definitions.  This leaves us with the following four 
definitional categories: 
 belief,  
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 desire,  
 some mental state (not beliefs) that accounts for the objectivity of our moral judgments, and  
 some mental state (not desires) that accounts for the motivation of our moral judgments.   
Combining them creates eight distinct types of potential mental states.  Below, I use “mere” to help 
distinguish the difference between belief as a category for formulating a definition of besire and belief 
(in the mere-sense) as a non-besire type of mental state.  The same convention applies to the use of 
mere desire.  A moral judgment could be:   
a. a mere belief,  
b. a mere desire,  
c. a mental state that is both a belief and a desire,  
d. a desire that accounts for the objectivity of our moral judgments (a special type of desire),  
e. a belief that accounts for the motivation of our moral judgments (a special type of belief),  
f. a mental state that only accounts for the objectivity of our moral judgments but is not a belief or 
a desire,  
 
g. a mental state that only accounts for the motivation of our moral judgments but is not a desire 
or a belief, 
 
h. a mental state that accounts for the motivation of our moral judgments and that accounts   
for the objectivity of our moral judgments but is not a belief or a desire.   
 
Any type of mental state that is something other than a) a mere belief, b) a mere desire, f) a mental 
state that only accounts for the objectivity of our moral judgments but is not a belief or a desire, and g) 
a mental state that only accounts for the motivation of our moral judgments but is not a desire or a 
belief should, according to this framework, tend to be considered a besire.  Fundamentally, the 
following are besire-like mental states:   
1. a mental state that is both a belief and a desire [c. above], 
2. a desire that accounts for the objectivity of our moral judgments (a special type of desire) [d. 
above], 
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3. a belief that accounts for the motivation of our moral judgments (a special type of belief) [e. 
above], 
 
4. a mental state that accounts for the motivation of our moral judgments and that accounts   
for the objectivity of our moral judgments but is not a belief or a desire [h. above].   
 
According to the first type of besire-like mental state, if besires are conceived in terms of belief and 
desire, then besires are conceived of as some third type of mental state that is both a belief and desire.  
In contrast, sometimes the composition of a besire is defined according to a belief or desire and some 
characteristic of beliefs and desires.  According to the second and third types of besire-like mental 
states, if besires are formulated in terms of a combination of belief and the complementary explanatory 
characteristic of a desire, or in terms of a combination of desire and the complementary explanatory 
characteristic of a belief, then besires can be conceived of as a special type or sub-type of belief or 
desire respectively.  For example, the second type of besire-like mental state is a belief that accounts for 
the motivation of our moral judgments, and the third type of besire-like mental state is a desire that 
accounts for the objectivity of our moral judgments.  There is also another possibility that qualifies as a 
besire according to the fundamental conception of a besire.  That is, according to the fourth type of 
besire-like mental state, a besire is not a belief or a desire, but rather a besire is a different sort of 
mental state that accounts for the motivation of our moral judgments and that accounts for the 
objectivity of our moral judgments.  Below, I examine each of these four types in more detail. 
Four Types of Besires 
 
 Considering the belief and desire type configuration of a besire, a definition of a besire could 
logically have four forms.  According to the first form, a besire is both a belief and a desire.  I will refer to 
this thesis as the besire-as-both conception of besire.  The besire-as-both theorist conceives of besires 
as hybrid states that are somehow a combination of both belief and desire.  The besire-as-both state has 
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been referred to as a Janus-like state8 or a hermaphrodite state.9  On this view, the moral judgment that 
“I ought to give money to Oxfam” is the expression of a mental state that is most accurately 
characterized as both a belief and a desire.  The besire-as-both mental state represents a state of affairs 
in the world:  for example, perceiving the effects of poverty, recognizing that one has more money than 
one needs, and understanding the institutional function of Oxfam.  The besire-as-both mental state is 
also motivating:  that is, it is a desire to give money to Oxfam.  In this case, expressing the besire-as-both 
mental state is similar to expressing that “I want to give money to Oxfam.”  Presumably, a besire-as-
both is motivating in the same way that a desire is motivating.  That is, both the desire and the besire-
as-both are necessarily motivating.  According to Smith, a central burden facing this type of besire 
theory is to show that a unitary mental state of a belief and desire (a besire-as-both) is coherent.10 
 According to the second form, a besire is a type of belief and not a desire.  I will refer to this 
thesis as the besire-as-belief conception of besire.  The besire-as-belief theorist conceives of besires as 
belief states that account for the motivation of our moral judgments by themselves and without an 
accompanying desire.  In this case, besires are special types of beliefs.  So, a besire-as-belief is not a 
hybrid state like a besire-as-both.  However, though a besire-as-belief is a type of belief, it is 
distinguishable from a mere belief because of its motivating capacity.  So, the moral judgment that “I 
ought to give money to Oxfam” is the expression of a mental state most accurately characterized as a 
belief.  The besire-as-belief mental state represents a state of affairs in the world:  for example, 
perceiving the effects of poverty, recognizing that one has more money than one needs, and 
understanding the institutional function of Oxfam.  The besire-as-belief mental state also accounts for 
the motivation of our moral judgments:  that is, it is a special type of belief that can motivate one to give 
                                                             
 
8
 David McNaughton, Moral Vision (Oxford:  Blackwell, 1988), 109. 
 
9
 Zangwill, 51. 
 10 Smith, The Moral Problem, 118. 
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money to Oxfam.  In this case, expressing the besire-as-belief mental state could be similar to expressing 
that “I want to give money to Oxfam,” but it does not have to be.   
 A besire-as-belief does not have to be motivating in the same way that a desire is motivating.  
There is no conceptual expectation that the besire-as-belief will be necessarily motivating.  In this case, 
this sort of besire might solve the moral problem by embracing externalism and denying that motivation 
entails a desire that necessarily motivates.  It may be that a besire-as-belief does necessarily motivate, 
but that is a separate matter to be determined by the specifics of the besire theory.  According to this 
conception of besire, motivation must be accounted for in some way without a desire.  A central burden 
facing this type of besire theory is to show that a belief can provide motivation.11 
 According to the third form, a besire is a type of desire and not a belief.  I will refer to this thesis 
as the besire-as-desire conception of besire.  The besire-as-desire theorist conceives of besires as desire 
states that represent a state of affairs in the world by themselves and without an accompanying belief.  
In this case, besires are special types of desires.  So, a besire-as-desire is not a hybrid state like a besire-
as-both.  However, though a besire-as-desire is a type of desire, it is distinguishable from a mere desire 
because of its representational capacity.  So, the moral judgment that “I ought to give money to Oxfam” 
is the expression of a mental state most accurately characterized as a desire.  The besire-as-desire 
mental state is motivating:  that is, it is a desire that motivates one to give money to Oxfam.  In this case, 
expressing the besire-as-desire mental state is similar to expressing that “I want to give money to 
Oxfam.”  The besire-as-desire mental state also represents a state of affairs in the world:  for example, 
perceiving the effects of poverty, recognizing that one has more money than one needs, and 
understanding the institutional function of Oxfam.   
 A besire-as-desire does not have to represent a state of affairs in the world exactly as a belief 
does.  According to this conception of besire, representation must be accounted for in some other way 
                                                             
 
11
 Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1970).  Here, Nagel provides 
a cognitive account of moral motivation. 
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besides a belief.  In this case, this sort of besire might solve the moral problem by embracing non-
cognitivism and denying that moral judgments express beliefs.  It may be that a besire-as-desire does 
represent the world exactly like belief, but that is a separate matter to be determined by the besire 
theory.  A central burden facing this type of besire theory is to show that our desires can have 
representational content.12 
 According to the fourth form, a besire is not a belief and not a desire.  I will refer to this thesis as 
the besire-as-neither conception of besire.  The besire-as-neither theorist conceives of a besire as 
something that accounts for the motivation of our moral judgments and that accounts for the objectivity 
of our moral judgments but is not a belief or a desire.  This is by far the loosest and broadest category of 
possible besire conceptions.  While it does offer a positive definition of a besire, it is framed by negative 
definitional components that do not specify what a besire is.   Rather, it tells what a besire is not.  The 
negative part of the definition of a besire-as-neither is that a besire is not a belief and not a desire.  The 
positive part of the definition of a besire-as-neither is that a besire is something that accounts for the 
motivation and the objectivity of our moral judgments.  As an example of this, I offer Linda Zagzebski’s 
analysis of an emotion and argue that it has the potential to be considered a besire-as-neither type of 
mental state.  In “Emotion and Moral Judgment”, Zagzebski writes: 
To take a moral example, a situation has the descriptive feature of being one in which a person with 
whom I do not identify is suffering.  (We might also need to add that I find the sufferer beneath me in 
status.)  My awareness of this descriptive feature, together with my emotional dispositions, leads me to 
be in the distinctive emotional state of feeling pity for the sufferer whom I see as pitiful.  I may express my 
emotion by simply saying, “She is pitiful.”  This judgment expresses an intrinsically motivating state since 
it expresses the emotion of pity; it is propositional in form, with a truth value, and I am asserting that 
proposition when I say “She is pitiful.”13 
 
Here is an example of a mental state that seems to satisfy the fundamental conception of a besire of the 
besire-as-neither type.  As presented by Zagzebski, this mental state represents a state of affairs in the 
                                                             
 12 Mark Platts, Ways of Meaning (London:  Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979); Mark Platts, “Moral Reality 
and the End of Desire,” in Mark Platts ed., Reference, Truth and Reality (London:  Routledge and Kegan, 1980).  
Here, Platts provides a non-cognitive account of representational moral judgment. 
 
13
 Linda Zagzebski, “Emotion and Moral Judgment,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2003):  
118. 
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world through the descriptive features of the sufferer, and it accounts for the motivation of our moral 
judgments due to its status as an emotion.  It seems to have the right mixture of parts to be a besire.   
 So, for this type of besire, the moral judgment that “I ought to give money to Oxfam” is the 
expression of a mental state most accurately characterized as a besire-as-neither.  In the Zagzebski case, 
perhaps something like an emotion. The besire-as-neither mental state accounts for the motivation of 
our moral judgments:  that is, it is a mental state that can motivate one to give money to Oxfam.  In this 
case, expressing the besire-as-neither mental state could be similar to expressing that “I want to give 
money to Oxfam,” but it does not have to be.  The besire-as-neither mental state also represents a state 
of affairs in the world:  for example, perceiving the effects of poverty, recognizing that one has more 
money than one needs, and understanding the institutional function of Oxfam.  However, a besire-as-
neither does not have to represent a state of affairs in the world exactly as a belief does, nor does it 
have to motivate exactly like a desire.  Indeed, a besire-as-neither cannot represent like a belief and 
motivate like a desire or else it would be a besire-as-both.  A central burden facing this type of besire 
theory is to explain in positive terms what a besire-as-neither is. 
The Types of Besires Applied to the Moral Problem 
 
 Following Brink’s version of the moral problem, one can formulate both acceptance claims and 
denial claims to each thesis of the moral problem and still hold a besire theory depending on which type 
of besire is accepted.  To illustrate this I will examine each of Brink’s theses.  My aim here is to facilitate 
the development of the concept of a besire.  In order to do that I assume that besire theory is plausible 
and independently motivated as a theory of moral judgment outside of its dependency on the moral 
problem.  This section is merely an exercise to help us understand the concept of a besire.  First, I will 
examine the following theses:  that moral judgments express beliefs, that motivation involves a desire or 
pro-attitude, and that there is no necessary connection between any belief and any desire or pro-
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attitude.  I will deal with the thesis that moral judgments entail motivation last as it requires special 
attention. 
Moral Judgments Express Beliefs 
 
 Can a besire theorist deny the claim that moral judgments express beliefs?  The answer is that it 
depends on the conception of besire assumed by the besire theorist.  If a theorist accepts the besire-as-
desire, besire-as-neither (and possibly the besire-as-both) formulations of besires, then she can deny 
that moral judgments express beliefs.  So, for example, imagine Debbie is a besire-as-desire theorist.  
She believes that moral judgments are expressions of unitary mental states that are desires and contain 
propositional content by themselves (a besire-as-desire).  According to Debbie, besires are not beliefs, 
but rather, besires are a special type of desire:  one that is capable of being true or false.  It is the pairing 
of the desire and propositional content that distinguishes by degree a besire-as-desire from a mere 
desire.  However, for Debbie, the pairing of a desire and propositional content distinguishes by type a 
besire-as-desire from a belief.  Therefore, Debbie must deny that moral judgments express beliefs 
because moral judgments are expressions of besires and, according to Debbie, besires are a special type 
of desire.   
 However, if a theorist accepts the besire-as-belief (and possibly besire-as-both) formulation(s) of 
besires, then she must hold that moral judgments are beliefs.  So, for example, imagine Betty is a besire-
as-belief theorist.  She believes that moral judgments are expressions of unitary mental states that are 
beliefs and are capable of motivating by themselves (a besire-as-belief).  According to Betty, besires are 
not desires, but rather, besires are a special type of belief:  one that is capable of motivating.  It is the 
pairing of the belief and motivational force that distinguishes a besire-as-belief from a mere belief.   This 
also distinguishes by type a besire-as-belief from a desire.  Betty must hold that moral judgments 
express beliefs because moral judgments are expressions of besires and, according to Betty, besires are 
a special type of belief. 
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 So, what type of besire theorist one is will determine whether one is a cognitivist or a non-
cognitivist about moral judgments.  This means that arguments directed against cognitivist conceptions 
of besire theory might be unable to address a portion of theoretically possible besire theories.  If an 
argument against besire theories is aimed at cognitivist forms of besires and claims to aim at all besire 
theories, then that argument against besire theory might be unsuccessful because a cognitivist 
restriction to the conception of a besire is too narrow to represent the full domain of possible besire 
theories.  This same problem applies to arguments directed against non-cognitivist conceptions of besire 
that claim to target all besire theories.  That is, arguments aimed at Betty’s conception of besire theory 
might not affect Debbie’s besire theory, and arguments aimed at Debbie’s conception of besire theory 
might not affect Betty’s besire theory because Debbie and Betty have different conceptions of besires.  
Motivation Involves a Desire or Pro-attitude  
 
 Can a besire theorist deny the claim that motivation involves a desire or pro-attitude?  The 
answer is that it depends on the conception of besire assumed by the besire theorist.  Before examining 
this thesis, it is worth noting that Brink’s formulation of this thesis is somewhat vague.  Specifically, by 
“involves,” I interpret Brink to mean that motivation necessarily requires a desire or pro-attitude.  So, if 
a theorist accepts the besire-as-belief or besire-as-neither formulation of besires, then she can deny that 
motivation necessarily requires a desire or pro-attitude.  For example, recall Betty who is a besire-as-
belief theorist.  She believes that moral judgments are expressions of unitary mental states that are 
beliefs that account for the motivation of our moral judgments (a besire-as-belief).  According to Betty, 
besires are not desires and do not necessarily require desires or pro-attitudes, but rather, besires are a 
special type of belief:  one that accounts for the motivation of our moral judgments without a non-
cognitive counterpart like a desire or pro-attitude.  It is the pairing of the belief with motivation that 
distinguishes by degree a besire-as-belief from a mere belief.  That is, both a besire-as-belief and a mere 
belief are types of belief.  For Betty, the pairing of a belief and motivation distinguishes by type a besire-
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as-belief from a desire.  That is, a besire-as-belief is a different type of mental state than a desire.  
Therefore, Betty must deny that moral judgments necessarily require desires or pro-attitudes.   
 However, if a theorist accepts the besire-as-desire or besire-as-both formulation(s) of besires, 
then she must accept that motivation necessarily requires a desire or pro-attitude.  So, for example, 
recall Debbie who is a besire-as-desire theorist.  She believes that moral judgments are expressions of 
unitary mental states that are desires and contain propositional content by themselves (a besire-as-
desire).  According to Debbie, besires are not beliefs, but rather, besires are a special type of desire:  one 
that contains propositional content.  It is the pairing of the desire and propositional content that 
distinguishes by degree a besire-as-desire from a mere desire.  Therefore, Debbie must hold that moral 
judgments necessarily require desires because moral judgments are expressions of besires and, 
according to Debbie, besires are a special type of desire.   
 So, what type of besire theorist one is will determine whether one can accept that motivation 
necessarily requires a desire or pro-attitude.  This means that arguments directed against conceptions of 
besire theory committed to the thesis that motivation requires a desire or pro-attitude might be unable 
to address a portion of possible besire theories.  If an argument against besire theory is aimed at 
motivation-necessarily-requires-a-desire-or-pro-attitude forms of besires and claims to aim at the 
existence of all besire theories, then that argument against that besire theory might be unsuccessful 
because a motivation-necessarily-requires-a-desire-or-pro-attitude restriction to the conception of a 
besire is too narrow to represent the full domain of possible besires theories.  This same problem 
applies to arguments directed against the conceptions of besire theory that deny that motivation 
necessarily requires a desire or pro-attitude and claim to target all besire theories.  That is, arguments 
aimed at Betty’s conception of besire theory might not affect Debbie’s besire theory, and arguments 
aimed at Debbie’s conception of besire theory might not affect Betty’s besire theory because Debbie 
and Betty have different conceptions of besires. 
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There is No Necessary Connection Between Any Belief and Any Desire or Pro-attitude 
 
 Can a besire theorist deny the claim that there is no necessary connection between any belief 
and any desire or pro-attitude?  The answer is that it depends on the conception of besire assumed by 
the besire theorist.  If a theorist accepts the besire-as-both and perhaps the besire-as-neither 
conceptions of besire, then a theorist can potentially deny that there is no necessary connection 
between any belief and any desire or pro-attitude.  That is, for example, a besire-as-both conception of 
besire theory is capable of accounting for some sort of necessary connection.  It could be argued that 
some sort of necessary connection claim is what is responsible for the claim that a besire is both a belief 
and a desire.  For example, imagine that Beth is a besire-as-both theorist.  She believes that moral 
judgments are expressions of unitary mental states that are both beliefs and desires (a besire-as-both).  
According to Beth, besires can be understood to require a necessary connection between a belief and a 
desire.  So, Beth can deny the claim that there is no necessary connection between any belief and any 
desire or pro-attitude. 
 However, if a theorist accepts the besire-as-belief or the besire-as-desire formulation(s) of 
besire, then a theorist can accept that there is no necessary connection between any belief and any 
desire or pro-attitude.  That is, for example, a besire-as-belief theorist can say that there is no 
connection needed between a belief and a desire because a besire-as-belief conception of besire does 
not require a desire.  For example, recall Betty who is a besire-as-belief theorist.  She believes that moral 
judgments are expressions of unitary mental states that are beliefs that account for the motivation of 
our moral judgments (a besire-as-belief).  According to Betty, besires do not require desires to account 
for the motivation of our moral judgments.  Therefore, Betty can deny that besires require a necessary 
connection between any belief and any desire or pro-attitude. 
 So, what type of besire theorist one is will determine whether one can deny that there is no 
necessary connection between any belief and any desire or pro-attitude.  This means that arguments 
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directed against conceptions of besire theory committed to the thesis that there is no necessary 
connection between any belief and any desire or pro-attitude might be unable to address a portion of 
possible besire theories.  If an argument against besire theory is aimed at there-is-no-necessary-
connection-between-any-belief-and-any-desire-or-pro-attitude forms of besire theory, then that 
argument might be unsuccessful because the there-is-no-necessary-connection-between-any-belief-
and-any-desire-or-pro-attitude restriction to the conception of a besire is too narrow to represent the 
full domain of possible besire theories.  This same problem applies to arguments that claim to target all 
besire theories and are directed against conceptions of besire theory that accept that there is no 
necessary connection between any belief and any desire or pro-attitude.  That is, arguments aimed at 
Beth’s conception of besire theory might not affect Betty’s besire theory, and arguments aimed at 
Betty’s conception of besire theory might not affect Beth’s besire theory because Betty and Beth have 
different conceptions of besires. 
Moral Judgments Entail Motivation 
 
 Can a besire theorist deny the claim that moral judgments entail motivation?  Before examining 
this thesis, it will be useful to formulate the debate between internalism and externalism.  Internalism is 
the position that moral judgments are necessarily motivating, and externalism is the denial of this 
claim.14  Both positions are concerned about accounting for motivation.  Internalism can be formulated 
in stronger and weaker versions.  Stronger versions hold that moral judgments are necessarily 
motivating and deny that anything else can impede one from acting on a moral judgment.  Weaker 
versions hold that moral judgments are necessarily motivating and accept that something can impede 
one from acting on a moral judgment.  Externalists can claim that indirectly moral judgments, at best, 
contingently motivate.  Different varieties of externalism are formulated according to what accounts for 
                                                             
 
14
 A traditional problem for this internalistic explanation of motivation is to account for the existence of 
amoralists.  Amoralists are people who seem to make a moral judgment yet have no motivation attached to that 
moral judgment. 
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this contingent motivation.  The usual formulation is to account for motivation by referring to some 
desire that accompanies the moral judgment, such as, when the moral judgment is considered to be a 
belief and when the desire is not necessarily connected to the moral judgment.   
 How does the internalism/externalism debate relate to besires?  Fundamentally, a besire is a 
unitary mental state that is capable of accounting for the objectivity of our moral judgments and is 
capable of accounting for the motivation of our moral judgments.  This basic conception of a besire is 
sometimes classified in terms of belief and desire.  So, a besire-as-both is a mental state of some belief 
and desire composition.  Typically, beliefs are considered to be capable of being objective insofar as 
beliefs are capable of being true or false, and so, desires are considered to be the key to explaining 
motivation.  Desires are mental states that necessarily motivate.  Couple this with the claim that beliefs 
are mental states that are not able to motivate and desires become very important to besire-as-both 
theories of motivation.  So, if desires necessarily motivate, then a theory of moral judgment that relies 
on desires to explain motivation is committed to moral judgments being necessarily motivating.   
 One way to avoid this commitment to internalism is to formulate a theory of moral judgment 
that is not committed to desires and is able to account for the motivational expectations we have of 
moral judgments.  To do this, it is helpful to think in terms of the capability to account for our 
motivational expectations and to remember that what our motivational expectations are is a separate 
matter.  If we expect that moral judgments are contingently motivating, then all the concept of a besire 
has to be able to account for is a mental state that has the capacity to motivate but may not always 
motivate.  If we expect that moral judgments are necessarily motivating, then the concept of a besire 
has to be able to account for why moral judgments always motivate.  The framework above that 
generated our possible conceptions of a besire is flexible enough to account for both internalistic and 
externalistic expectations.  More specifically, the besire-as-both and besire-as-desire conceptions both 
compositionally require a desire, and so, both can account for internalistic expectations of moral 
 21 
 
judgments.  The besire-as-belief and besire-as-neither conceptions both do not compositionally require 
a desire, as such, both can account for externalistic expectations of moral judgments.  This is not to say 
these are explanatorily adequate options, but it is to say that these two conceptions are the most likely 
options from which to develop an adequate theory.  Both the besire-as-belief and besire-as-neither 
conceptions are viable because both are conceptions of besire that can account for motivation without 
relying on a desire.  Consequently, both are able to provide explanations of motivation that are not 
internalistic.  There is nothing about the conception of a besire-as-belief or a besire-as-neither that 
makes besire theories that rely on those conceptions of besire necessarily incompatible with an 
externalist explanation of motivation. 
 The existence of besires that are compatible with externalism might not be an attractive option 
to some externalists.  If besires exist, then our economy of mental states becomes more complex.  One 
could argue it is simpler to say that there are no besires at all.   However, this appeal to simplicity has to 
be qualified by a theory’s ability to adequately explain the phenomena in question.  If one accepts the 
general amoralist objection to internalism and seeks to provide some account for why, more times than 
not, our moral judgments do seem to motivate, then a besire type of mental state could provide a 
possible explanation.  Establishing its plausibility as an adequate theory of moral judgment is another 
matter.  The point is that the concept of a besire is not inextricably bound to internalism, and it could be 
useful in framing a motivational theory that explains how the intuition that moral judgments do seem to 
motivate might be made compatible with the intuition that in some cases moral judgments do not seem 
to motivate. 
 If a theorist determines that an adequate theory of moral motivation is best explained by the 
claim that moral judgments contingently motivate, then she can deny that moral judgments entail 
motivation.  Likewise, if a theorist determines that an adequate theory of moral motivation is best 
explained by the claim that moral judgments necessarily motivate, then she can accept that moral 
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judgments entail motivation.  Specifically, theories of moral motivation are presented in terms of 
internalism and externalism.  Internalism is distinguished from externalism by reference to the thesis 
that moral judgments entail motivation.  So, what type of besire theorist one is will determine whether 
one can accept that moral judgments entail motivation.  This means that arguments directed against 
conceptions of besires committed to internalism might be unable to address a portion of possible besire 
theories.  If an argument against besire theory is aimed at internalistic forms of besire theory and claims 
to aim at the existence of all besire theories, then that argument against that besire theory might be 
unsuccessful because an internalism restriction to the conception of a besire is too narrow to represent 
the full domain of possible besire theories.  This same problem applies to arguments directed against 
the externalistic forms of besire theory that claim to target all besire theories. 
Section Summary 
 
 Denial of one of the moral problem theses should place the denier into a specific camp.  But, 
besires, depending on their type formulation and interpretation, seem to allow us to at least choose a 
variety of sub-positions under each thesis depending on the type and interpretation of besire chosen.  
These sub-positions are not clearly outlined by the four theses, and so they can easily be overlooked.   
 There is a good reason to think that the incompleteness of Brink’s mapping is the issue.  The 
issue is not the incoherence of position distinctions implicit in each thesis, or the incoherence of the 
conception of a besire.  There are no logical problems with formulating, for example, a cognitivism and 
non-cognitivism divide: non-cognitivism being the denial of cognitivism.  There also are no logical 
problems with the possible formulations of a conception of besire.  A besire-as-both, a besire-as-belief, a 
besire-as-desire, and a besire-as-neither represent the complete domain from which to formulate a 
definition of besire.  It is important to note, so far there has been no claim made about whether 
cognitivism is true or false, or whether besires exist or do not exist.  The matter here is simply one of 
presenting the possible metaethical positions, and the claim at issue is whether Brink’s version of the 
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moral problem is a complete assessment of the relevant metaethical positions.  I have argued that it is 
not nuanced enough to help facilitate a detailed and therefore complete understanding of besire theory. 
A Besire Theory Map 
 
 One way to approach besire theory and outline the possible forms of besire is by strategizing on 
how to escape the following dilemma: 
 Premise 1:   If moral judgments are only beliefs, then we are unable to account for the  
   motivation of moral judgments.   
 
 Premise 2: If moral judgments are only desires, then we are unable to account for the  
   objectivity of moral judgments.   
 
 Premise 3: Moral judgments are either beliefs or desires.   
   
 Conclusion: So, either we are unable to account for the motivation of moral judgments, or  
   we are unable to account for the objectivity of moral judgments. 
 
Besire theory is attractive because it allows us to escape this dilemma by denying one of the premises.  
Denying Premise 1 commits us to the claim that beliefs by themselves are able to account for the 
motivational force of our moral judgments.  This is the basic assumption of the besire-as-belief 
conception of besire.  Denying Premise 2 commits us to the claim that desires by themselves are able to 
account for the objectivity of our moral judgments.  This is the basic assumption of the besire-as-desire 
conception of besire.  Denying Premise 3 commits us to the claim that moral judgments express 
something other than beliefs or desires.  This is the basic assumption of the besire-as-both and besire-
as-neither conceptions of besire.  The conclusion, that both objectivity and motivation matter to an 
adequate account of moral judgment, I take to be understood in its most trivial sense.  This statement 
makes no claim as to whether internalism or externalism is true, or whether the strong or weak variety 
of either is adequate.  It also makes no claim about what sense of true or false is adequate for a theory 
of moral judgment.  Whether true or false are determined by subjective criteria, cultural criteria, or 
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universal and absolute criteria is important to determine, but it is beside the point for the purpose of 
this paper.    
Critiquing Critiques of Besire Theory 
 
 The conceptual analysis of a besire has a significant effect on some recent objections to besire 
theory.  Below, I analyze three arguments designed to critique besire theory as a whole.  I argue that 
their attempts fail insofar as certain types and interpretations of besire theory can be defended from 
their arguments.  I do not provide an exhaustive analysis of each argument because showing that at 
least one type or interpretation of besire theory is defensible is enough to show the error in their 
arguments.  I have chosen what I take to be the most damaging types and interpretations for each 
argument’s analysis.  First, I analyze an argument by Smith on the conceptual incoherence of besires.  
Second, I analyze two arguments on the explanatory failure of besire theory:  the first by Blackburn on 
moral criticism, and the second by Zangwill on motivational variability. 
Smith’s Critique of Besire Theory 
 
 In The Moral Problem, Smith uses the metaphor of a direction of fit as a framework from which 
to assess the coherence of a besire.  According to Smith, the idea that a mental state could have both a 
belief and desire direction of fit is incoherent.  To have a belief direction of fit means that when mental 
state p is exposed to fact not-p, then the agent should possess mental state not-p.  That is, state p would 
extinguish.   And, to have a desire direction of fit means that when mental state p is exposed to fact not-
p, then the agent should strive to possess fact p while retaining mental state p.  That is, state p would 
persist.  This means, according to Smith’s characterization of a besire theory of moral judgment that an 
agent would have to possess a state that both ceases to exist in the presence of fact p and endures in 
the presence of fact p.  That is, the agent would have to hold a state that is both suppose to extinguish 
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and persist.15  Therefore, Smith concludes that it is not possible for there to be such a thing as a besire 
state.  The argument can be streamlined and constructed as follows: 
1. If besires exist, then it is possible for someone to be in a mental state with direction of fit p and 
not-p at time t. 
 
2. It is not possible for someone to be in a mental state with direction of fit p and not-p at time t. 
 
3. Therefore, besires do not exist.16 
 
Below, I reformulate Smith’s argument using the besire-as-desire conception.  By examining the besire-
as-desire formulation of Smith’s objection, I will argue that the besire-as-desire conception of besire 
theory can be defended from Smith’s argument. 
 Reformulating Smith’s argument according to the besire-as-desire conception of besire results in 
the following: 
1. If besires-as-desires exist, then it is possible for someone to be in a mental state with direction 
of fit p and not-p at time t. 
 
2. It is not possible for someone to be in a mental state with direction of fit p and not-p at time t. 
 
3. Therefore, besires-as-desires do not exist. 
 
Smith argues that a besire is the combination of two separate and incompatible mental states.  This 
results in a logically impossible concept.  For Smith, besires are like round squares.   Smith’s argument is 
formulated for the besire-as-both conception of besire, and Smith’s direction of fit analysis is supposed 
to establish that a besire is conceptually incoherent because a besire is a state that tends to extinguish 
and persist at the same time.  However, a besire-as-desire is different from a besire-as-both.  In a sense, 
the besire-as-desire theorist is proposing a unitary state that is unable to be conceptually divided in to 
two separate unitary states (a belief and a desire).  A besire-as-desire is a special type of desire and not a 
conglomerate of two states.  This may seem like a relatively minor point, but it highlights the importance 
of considering other possible conceptions of besire.  Smith’s response could be to defend the following:  
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 Smith, The Moral Problem, 111-112. 
 16 Ibid., 118. 
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besires are unitary mental states, and besires are composed of two opposing directions of fit.  So, if a 
besire is a desire, then there is no separate belief state.  But there are two opposing directions of fit.  
Smith can simply modify his conception and retain the force of his direction of fit analysis by arguing 
that unitary mental states with opposing directions of fit are logically impossible. 
 Smith’s direction of fit argument implies that not only are unitary mental states with opposing 
directions of fit incoherent, but that all unitary states with opposing directions of fit are incoherent.  
That is, any unitary state that both tends to x and tends to not-x is incoherent.  However, consider the 
following example:  imagine a football team and consider the roles different parts of a football team 
have.  The offense of a football team scores points and the defense of a football team prevents points 
from being scored.  In terms of direction of fit analysis, the offense tends to score points and the 
defense tends to prevent points from being scored.  The offense tends to move the football toward the 
opposing team’s end zone while the defense tends to stop the football from being moved toward their 
end zone.  So far, we have a unitary state (football team) with two opposing directions of fit and no 
conceptual incoherence.   
 Smith may object that this example is a poor one because both the offense and the defense are 
not on the field at the same time, and the concept of a besire requires that a moral judgment have both 
directions of fit at a specific time.  Although it seems that a football team does provide a counter 
example to Smith’s claim, assume his objection is sound.  A besire-as-desire theorist can concede this 
point without worry because the besire conception favored by the besire-as-desire theorist does not 
require that a besire be composed of two separate states.  It only requires that a besire be understood 
as a desire with objective content.  So, it only requires that it is possible to conceive of a unitary state 
with two opposing directions of fit.  This is not as strange as it may seem.  To illustrate this, consider just 
the offensive side of the football team.  During a football game an offense functions defensively.  It 
remains the offensive side of the football team yet fulfills the defensive responsibilities:  it tends to stop 
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the football from being moved toward their end zone.   It does this by functioning as the offense and 
keeping possession of the ball away from the opposing team.  Under special conditions, an offense may 
have to act defensively.  Suppose the offense fumbles or throws an interception.  The offense then has a 
defensive job.  So, when the offense is on the field, it has both directions of fit; it has both the 
disposition to score points and to prevent points from being scored.  The offense is a unitary state with 
two opposing directions of fit at the same time.   
 Smith’s argument does not work against all types of besires because the besire-as-desire state 
does not need to be conceived of as having a separable belief state component of the type that the 
argument specifies.  Smith’s argument seems to presuppose that a besire has to be formulated as a 
combination of two unitary states.  But this is precisely what the besire-as-desire theorist denies 
because a besire-as-desire is not a combination of two unitary states.  For Smith’s objection to work, 
there needs to be conflict that renders the mental state logically impossible, so any besire theory that 
can be formulated as a unitary state without such conflict is immune to Smith’s argument.  If Smith’s 
objection is understood solely in terms of the logical impossibility of a unitary state with two opposing 
directions of fit, then it is unsuccessful because there are unitary states with two opposing directions of 
fit as the above example of the concept of a football team illustrates.  While a football team is not a 
mental state, conceptually a football team is logically possible and does have two opposing directions of 
fit.  So, Smith has to explain what it is specifically about a besire-like mental state that makes it 
incoherent without relying solely on his general objection about the incoherence of unitary states with 
opposing directions of fit.  If Smith’s objection is reformulated around this response and set solely in 
terms of mental states without relying on his general objection against the coherence of unitary states 
with opposing directions of fit, then it is unsuccessful because Smith has not established what 
specifically it is about the mental status of the besire state that makes it necessarily incoherent.  In fact, 
when the players and coaches of the offensive side of the football team design plays and make decisions 
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about the game, it seems they do have a mental state with two opposing directions of fit, namely, that 
of a football team. 
 In summary, Smith’s argument is designed to address the conceptual incoherence of a besire.  
This conceptual incoherence is derived from Smith’s direction of fit analysis.  The discovery of a unitary 
state with two opposing directions of fit undermines Smith’s argument.  The concepts of a football team 
and an offensive side of a football team seem to be actual examples of unitary states with two opposing 
directions of fit.  If besires are logically impossible because besires are unitary states with two opposing 
directions of fit, then Smith’s argument against besire theory is unsuccessful because unitary states with 
opposing directions of fit are possible, in fact, they are actual.  Whether besires are actual is another 
matter.  So, Smith needs to provide something beyond the direction of fit analysis to establish that 
besires do not exist. 
Blackburn’s Critique of Besire Theory 
 
 In Ruling Passions, Blackburn offers an argument against besire theory.  Before looking at the 
argument, it is necessary to examine the conceptual framework Blackburn uses to analyze moral 
judgments.  Blackburn adopts a functionalistic stance for his inquiry by using the following analogy:  
moral agents are like devices that take input and deliver output.  According to Blackburn, the input to 
the moral agent is a representation of the facts of the case.  It is the properties of the action, event, 
case, etc. in question.  The output of the moral agent is the attitude resulting from the input.  It is the 
favoring or disfavoring, acceptance or withdrawal, like or dislike, etc. toward the input in question.17  
With that said, Blackburn offers the following argument: 
1. If besires exist, then we cannot separate input from output properly. 
 
2. If we cannot separate input from output properly, then we cannot make moral criticisms. 
 
3. If besires exist, then we cannot make moral criticisms. 
                                                             
 17 Blackburn, 5. 
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4. We can make moral criticisms. 
 
5. Therefore, besires do not exist.18 
 
Blackburn argues that there is something about a besire such that if a moral agent actually had one, it 
would short circuit our ability to morally criticize that moral agent or, following Blackburn’s analogy, the 
moral device.  The collapse of the divide between input and output renders moral criticism impossible, 
and that is simply too high a price to pay for Blackburn.  
 Blackburn illustrates this point with the example of boys at a boarding school teasing a 
newcomer.  According to Blackburn, our ability to morally judge the boys depends on our ability to 
separate what the boys perceive about the newcomer from the boys’ attitude toward the newcomer.  
According to Blackburn, the besire theorist can only argue that if the boys fail to treat the newcomer 
well, it is because the boys lack the “full amalgam state” that constitutes the besire.19  That is the best a 
besire theorist can do in forming their moral critique of the boys’ behavior toward the newcomer, and it 
is insufficient.  Blackburn’s point is that the criteria necessary to establish moral criticism is determined 
by input matching proper output rather than with the possession of a besire state.   
 For Blackburn, if the concept of a besire impedes our ability to make moral judgments, then 
besires do not exist.  The crucial idea is that existence of a besire state limits the scope of our moral 
criticism to criticism of perception.   No longer can what the boys perceived (their input) be 
distinguished from their attitude (their output) toward the newcomer.  If the boys possessed the besire 
resulting in teasing the newcomer, then what they saw cannot be distinguished from what they did 
(tease the newcomer) in any way.  That is, the results of the boys’ should-he-be-teased test as applied to 
the newcomer cannot be identified apart from the teasing of the newcomer, and the blending of the 
boys’ cognitive and conative states, that a besire requires, eliminates the ability to properly blame the 
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boys for teasing the newcomer.   All the besire theorist seems able to say, according to Blackburn, is that 
the boys simply saw the shyness and sensitivity of the newcomer differently than the boys who did not 
tease the newcomer.  The boys’ perceptions seamlessly result in the newcomer being teased, and the 
concept of a besire renders useless the analytic tools crucial to moral criticism:  specifically, those 
concepts that allow us to distinguish input from output.  Below, I reformulate Blackburn’s argument 
using the besire-as-both conception of besire.  By examining the besire-as-both formulation of 
Blackburn’s argument, I will argue that the besire-as-both conception of besire is immune to Blackburn’s 
argument. 
 Reformulating Blackburn’s argument according to the besire-as-both conception of besire 
results in the following: 
1. If besires-as-both exist, then we cannot separate input from output properly. 
 
2. If we cannot separate input from output properly, then we cannot make moral criticisms. 
 
3. If besires-as-both exist, then we cannot make moral criticisms. 
 
4. We can make moral criticisms. 
 
5. Therefore, besires-as-both do not exist. 
 
Blackburn’s argument against the besire-as-both conceptions of besire theory fails to eliminate the 
possibility of moral criticism.  If the composite besire-as-both is identifiable as a belief and a desire, then 
it is possible that each part of the composite can be distinguished from the other.  For a similar example, 
imagine a football team practicing by scrimmaging against itself.  The offense is on the field running 
plays against the defense.  There is one football team on the field, but that single team can be identified 
in terms of offensive players and defensive players.  The concept of a football team includes the idea of 
offensive and defensive players, and the coaches would have a hard time evaluating the scrimmage 
without that distinction.  The ability to distinguish between offensive and defensive players allows the 
coaches to praise or criticize the football team.  Likewise, the concept besire-as-both, by definition, 
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includes the distinction necessary for moral criticism, because the concept is composed of a 
distinguishable belief and desire.  It is possible that the belief part of the unitary state can be 
distinguished from the desire part and vice versa just like the concept of a football team allows for 
offensive players to be distinguished from defensive players.  If the belief and the desire components 
are distinguishable as the concept of besire-as-both implies, then moral criticism can be directed toward 
each separate component.   
 In reference to Blackburn’s example of the boys teasing the newcomer, conceptually, in this 
case, there is nothing about the mixture, fusion, or blending of a belief and a desire that would 
necessarily result in the elimination of our ability to distinguish input (the boys’ perceptions) from 
output (the boys’ attitude to tease).  Adding another person to Blackburn’s example will help to 
illustrate this point.  Imagine there is a teacher, Susan, in the vicinity of the boys as they tease the 
newcomer.  Susan witnesses the incident and approaches the boys.  When she arrives in front of the 
boys she asks them why they are teasing the newcomer.  Susan receives a list of answers including the 
following:  the newcomer looks down when approached by others, blushes easily, and is quiet.  These 
descriptions are the boys’ beliefs.  She then proceeds to discuss with the boys the attitudes they have 
toward these mannerisms.  If the boys are in possession of a besire-as-both toward the newcomer, the 
criticisms Susan gives may fall on deaf ears, but not because of Susan’s inability to make the criticisms.  
If Blackburn’s argument is correct, we would expect Susan’s criticisms of the boys to be impossible to 
coherently formulate.  The criticism would have to be meaningless or at least irrelevant. 
 However, this conception of besire does not render belief and desire criticisms untenable.  If the 
boys have a besire-as-both, it is unclear why such a conception of besire should eliminate Susan’s ability 
for moral criticism.  If the boys’ mental state, the one resulting in the teasing of the newcomer, is a 
besire-as-both, then their mental state can be analyzed in terms of belief and desire.  If the mental state 
underwriting their moral judgments can be analyzed in terms of belief and desire, then moral criticism 
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can be addressed toward the belief components and desire components of the mental state in question.  
The boys may not understand or care, but the point is that Susan has access to the analytic tools to 
make moral criticisms of the boys just as the coaches, who understand that their football team has 
offensive and defensive players, have the analytic tools necessary to criticize their football team.  The 
concept besire-as-both allows moral criticism to be fine grained enough to say more about the boys’ 
teasing than that the boys simply saw the newcomer’s mannerisms, and that seamlessly this perception 
resulted in the boys teasing the newcomer.  The besire-as-both concept provides Susan with the ability 
to distinguish belief and desire, and that, as an analytic tool, is sufficient enough to render adequate 
moral criticism.  Blackburn’s argument fails against the besire-as-both conception of besire theory 
because the besire-as-both concept is not necessarily of an un-analyzable mental state that rules out the 
possibility of moral criticism.  As such, the besire-as-both conception of besire theory is immune to 
Blackburn’s objection. 
 
Zangwill’s Critique of Besire Theory 
 
 In “Besires and the Motivation Debate,” Zangwill argues that besire theory needs to account for 
the motivational variability of our moral judgments, and he argues that the variability of motivation is to 
be understood in terms of rational indifference.  By rational indifference, Zangwill has in mind the 
instances when we possess moral judgments that differ in motivational intensity.  For example, imagine 
that John makes the moral judgment to donate money to Oxfam on Tuesday after he sees a billboard 
detailing the effects of poverty in Haiti.  John is very motivated by his moral judgment.  However, he 
does not have access to a phone at the moment because his cell phone battery is dead, so he plans on 
donating money on Wednesday when he has access to a phone.  On Wednesday, John recalls the moral 
judgment to donate money and is only slightly motivated to act.  Zangwill’s charge is that a theory of 
moral judgment has to explain this variability, and it is unclear how a besire theorist could account for 
such phenomena since a besire theorist is committed to moral judgments being necessarily motivating.  
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With this challenge in mind, Zangwill argues that externalism has a simple answer to explain these 
phenomena.  Motivation can be accounted for by the presence of a desire independent of the moral 
judgment to send money to Oxfam.  So, the variability in motivation between Tuesday and Wednesday 
can be accounted for by the presence of different independent desires on each day.  And so, Zangwill’s 
argument against besire theory can be formulated as follows: 
1. If rational indifference is possible, then we have a good reason to believe besires do not exist. 
 
2. Rational indifference is possible. 
 
3. Therefore, we have a good reason to believe besires do not exist.20 
 
Zangwill’s argument is different from Smith’s and Blackburn’s argument in that it explicitly posits besire 
theory as committed to cognitive internalism.  So, a more general approach to Zangwill’s argument is in 
order.   Below, I reformulate Zangwill’s argument using the besire-as-belief conception of besire theory.  
By examining the besire-as-belief formulation of Zangwill’s argument, I will argue that the besire-as-
belief conception of besire theory is potentially immune to Zangwill’s argument. 
 Reformulating Zangwill’s argument according to the besire-as-belief conception of besire results 
in the following: 
1. If rational indifference is possible, then we have a good reason to believe besires-as-beliefs do 
not exist. 
 
2. Rational indifference is possible. 
 
3. Therefore, we have a good reason to believe besires-as-beliefs do not exist. 
 
Zangwill’s conception of besire is too limited to justify his conclusion.  Zangwill starts by limiting his 
inquiry to “cognitivist forms of Internalism,”21 and then, by the end of the article, he is making a claim 
“against moral besires of any sort.”22  According to Zangwill, if you are committed to the existence of 
besires, then you are committed to some form of motivational internalism.  The success of Zangwill’s 
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objection from rational indifference against besire theory requires that all besires are moral beliefs that 
are necessarily motivating.  A significant portion of possible besire conceptions are outside the scope of 
his argument such as those conceptions of besire theory that are not both belief-based and necessarily 
motivating.  For example, the besire-as-belief conception of besire theory is not necessarily motivating.  
A rational indifference objection makes sense only if our moral judgments are belief-based types of 
besires, and if besires are desire-based and necessarily motivating.  But, if a type of besire is not 
necessarily motivating, then why expect that the moral motivation of that type of besire is unable to 
vary over time?  If the besire mental state is contingently motivating, then it offers the same explanatory 
benefit that Zangwill’s preferred version of externalism offers.23  If an externalistic theory of motivation 
is a viable explanation for the motivational variance of John’s moral judgment to give money to Oxfam, 
then a mental state, such as a besire-as-belief, that is compatible with an externalistic theory of 
motivation is capable of explaining the motivational variance of John’s moral judgment to give money to 
Oxfam.   
 According to Zangwill’s explanation of rational indifference, moral beliefs remain constant over 
time while the motivational force varies.  A besire theory of moral judgment that is not desire-based is 
not necessarily committed to internalism; consequently, a besire theorist can embrace the externalistic 
theory of motivation that Zangwill champions.  Zangwill argues that the best explanation of motivational 
variability is the presence of another mental state distinct from the moral judgment like a desire or an 
emotion.24  However, if a besire theorist is not necessarily committed to internalism, a besire theory is 
still a viable option to explain rational indifference and in turn our moral judgments.  It would take more 
evidence to prove that it is the best explanatory option, but the point is a besire-as-belief is not 
conceptually precluded from doing so.  For example, while a besire-as-both conception of besire theory 
seems to be open to Zangwill’s argument, a besire-as-belief conception of besire theory seems able to 
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avoid the charge of internalism as something other than a desire could account for the motivational 
force of the besire.  The same applies to the concept of a besire-as-neither.  Consequently, it is not clear 
why rational indifference should make one question the existence of all types of besires.   
Conclusion 
 
 In this paper, I have argued that distinguishing between different types and interpretations of 
besires is a critical tool for adequately assessing besire theory.  I have attempted to support this claim by 
showing how a systematic analysis of the concept of a besire can be used to defend besire theories from 
some objections.  First, I have done this by developing our conception of a besire while showing how a 
besire theory can be conceptually formulated to accept or deny each thesis of the moral problem and 
still remain a besire theory.  And, second, I have done this by showing how a besire theory can be 
conceptually formulated to avoid both conceptual incoherence and explanatory failure objections 
leveled at besire theory by Smith, Blackburn, and Zangwill.  The arguments by Smith, Blackburn, and 
Zangwill do not show that besires do not exist.   
 Though not conclusive, the failure of Smith’s, Blackburn’s and Zangwill’s arguments suggests 
that showing whether or not besires exist may not be a matter of the philosophical analysis they each 
employ.  That is, the question of the existence of besires might be better served by empirical analysis 
coupled with conceptual analysis.  If besires are like round squares, then there is no reason to look for 
them.  However, if the concept of a besire is not incoherent and is not explanatorily irrelevant, then 
empirical investigation in to the existence of besires could be reasonable and perhaps warranted.  There 
might not be any besires; that is, besires may not actually exist.  But, if the argument here holds, it could 
suggest that proving whether or not besires exist is also a matter for empirical psychology and 
neuroscience.  If this is true, the present and further development of the concept of a besire could help 
us to formulate the questions for empirical investigation. 
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 The analysis of this paper also provides the means to challenge the conditional claim that if 
besires exist, then cognitive internalism is true.  Assuming besires will satisfy the objective and 
motivational expectations we have of our moral judgments whatever specifically they might be, support 
for this conditional can be divided in to two supporting arguments.  The first supporting argument is as 
follows: 
 Premise 1:  If besires exist, then moral judgments are beliefs. 
 
 Premise 2:  If moral judgments are beliefs, then cognitivism is true. 
 
 Conclusion:  If besires exist, then cognitivism true. 
 
The error in this argument is that Premise 1 is false.  There are types of besires that are not beliefs, so 
besires are not necessarily beliefs.  The besire-as-desire and besire-as-neither conceptions of a besire 
provide counterexamples that show this premise is false.  The second supporting argument is as follows: 
 Premise 1:  If besires exist, then moral judgments are desires. 
 
 Premise 2:  If moral judgments are desires, then internalism true. 
 
 Conclusion:  If besires exist, then internalism true. 
 
The error in this argument is that Premise 1 is false.  There are types of besires that are not desires, so 
besires are not necessarily desires.   The besire-as-belief and the besire-as-neither conceptions of a 
besire provide counterexamples that show this premise is false.  And, returning to the original 
conditional, only one of these objections needs to be successful to cause a problem for the conditional 
claim that if besires exist, then cognitive internalism is true. 
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